Abstract: This paper investigates the determinants of government size at the provincial level in China. We employ the panel data model as a platform for empirical analysis and control for endogeneity in the study. Our study shows that openness to trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) may curtail government expansion, and that the provincial-level public sector is characterized by economies of scale. This study also documents that Wagner"s law does not hold true for China. Moreover, both expenditure decentralization and revenue decentralization contribute to the expansion of China"s government.
Introduction
The determinants of government size have been an important research area in the literature of economics and political science. After World War II, the size of the public sector expanded in most countries (Cooke 2003; Mueller 2003) . Since the 1980s, in the name of new public administration and reinventing government, many countries have attempted to constrain governmental growth even to reduce its size.
Since the 1980s, China has also made great efforts to control government expansion. In 1982 , Deng Xiaoping (1984 , the Chinese supreme leader, stressed that "streamlining organizations is a matter of great importance. In fact, it constitutes a revolution." Since then, there have been six nationwide downsizing campaigns.
These downsizing movements achieved little success. In some cases, when central government positions were eliminated, officials made redundant by the eliminations were transferred to new positions in publicly funded service units, such as schools. Thus, in terms of decreasing the number of public employees, downsizing movements fell short of reaching their goal. Yang (2004: 53) also points out that, in terms of reducing government payroll spending, "the reforms have yielded few dividends so far."
Aggregate data also document an increase in government size. The heaviest cut in public employment was implemented in 1998. Official accounts indicate a decrease of 1.15 million government administrative positions from 1998 to 2002. The number of public officials was reduced by 20% for central-and provincial-level party organizations, 47.5% for the State Council, 48.2% for provincial governments and prefectures, and 19.4% for counties and townships (Burns 2003) . Nevertheless, the number of budgeted employees (civil servants plus employees, such as teachers, in public service units) actually kept increasing.
1 As illustrated 3 in Figure 1 , the ratio of local public employees to the total population expanded substantially during the period of [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] . [Insert Fig.1 here] Government size, measured by government expenditure as a share of GDP, has also
shown an upward trend in recent years. It was 12. 79% of GDP in 1998, 17.24% in 2001 and  18.52% in 2005 (see Figure 2 ). By 2007, government spending was close to 20% of GDP.
[Insert Fig.2 here]
The main reasons for the expansion of China"s government, as suggested in the literature, include "maintaining political patronage" (Burns 2003) , "party control" (Brødsgaard 2002) , the "authoritarian nature of China"s political system" (Ngok and Zhu 2007) and "unsuccessful government function shifts" (Ni and An 2008) . While this literature may have identified some causes of government growth in China, emphasizing solely the unique characteristics of the Chinese political system may overlook some important factors that also play roles in determining government size. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, empirical studies on government size using Chinese data are still rare.
This paper attempts to fill the gap in literature by providing a careful empirical investigation of the determinants of government size in China. While controlling for the special characteristics of China and examining the factors that are commonly mentioned in literature (for instance, Wagner"s law), we believe that the test results should not only be relevant to those who are interested in China"s case but also relevant for improving our understanding of government growth.
Our study provides some potentially intriguing findings that are rarely documented in literature. The results show that openness to trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) may curtail government expansion. In addition, large population size tends to drive down 4 government size, suggesting that scale economies at the provincial level apply in China"s case.
By employing a longitudinal dataset at China"s provincial level from 1998 to 2006, our study investigates the determinants of local government size by utilizing both cross-sectional variations and volatility over time. The cross-sectional variations in the data make it possible to examine the role of local heterogeneity (such as, for instance, economy growth, minority population density and local public budget deficits) in the process of local government expansion. The volatility over time helps us to handle the endogeneity issue, which will be explained in detail in a later section.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief summary of the literature on the determinants of government size in China. Section 3 discusses the data, definition of variables, model specifications and econometric issues. Empirical results obtained are reported in Section 4. Section 5 presents discussion based on our empirical findings. The final section offers conclusions and policy implications.
Variables explaining government size and theoretical arguments
Based on the existing literature, this section summarizes factors that play roles in determining government size generally, while also outlining factors that may be unique in China"s case.
These factors include (1) economic development, (2) economies of scale, (3) openness to trade and FDI, (4) fiscal decentralization, (5) minority population density and (6) demand for public services.
Economic development. Wagner (1893) introduced the idea that there is a positive relationship between economic development and expansion of the public sector. Economic development leads to a simultaneous increase in government size since people will demand more and better public services when society becomes more affluent (Tobin 2005; Zhu and 5 Krug 2005). Empirical evidence for this argument is mixed. Akitoby et al. (2006) argue that, though there is strong evidence from industrialized countries, Wagner"s law does not hold true in developing countries like China. Recent studies also cast doubt on the existence of Wagner"s law (Halicioglu 2003; Lin and Song, 2002; Iyare and Lorde, 2004; Ram 1987; Sinha 2007; Zhang 2007 Zhang , 2008a Ziramba 2008) . The existing studies usually fail to address the endogeneity issue when they test the validity of Wagner"s law. The causal relationship between government size and economic development may be opposite of that proposed by Wagner"s law; large government size may lead to local economic growth.
Research that fails to handle this issue will provide misleading results. In our study, we deal with this reverse causality problem and provide new evidence from China. propose that openness to trade and FDI inflows reduces bureaucratic expansion.
Fiscal decentralization. Discussing the Leviathan hypothesis, Brennan and Buchanan (1980: 185) point out that "total government intrusion into economy should be smaller, ceteris paribus, the greater the extent to which taxes and expenditures are decentralized."
Nevertheless, empirical studies on the Leviathan hypothesis present a mixed picture (Marlow 1988; Oates 1985) . Since it is not clear whether the impact of decentralization on government size varies when the forms of decentralization differ, Brennan and Buchanan"s (1980) collusion hypothesis was put forward as an alternative to the Leviathan hypothesis. The collusion hypothesis proposes that, if the central government collects all taxes and then redistributes some of that revenue to local governments, the effect of decentralization in 7 reducing government expansion may be reduced. 2 Brennan and Buchanan (1980: 183) note that "revenue sharing is undesirable, because it subverts the primary purpose of federalism, which is to create competition between jurisdictions." Empirical evidence indicates that the collusion hypothesis holds true in many countries (Chen 2004; Ehdaie 1994; Grossman 1989; Stein 1998; Zhu and Krug 2005) .
We have a similar hypothesis; fiscal decentralization may reduce government expansion at the local or provincial level when higher authorities do not grant local governments substantial fiscal transfers. Otherwise, even though expenditure decentralization is present, central fiscal subsidies may invite fiscal profligacy and bureaucratic expansion at the local or provincial level.
Minority density. We hypothesize that minority density-the proportion of minority populations in the total population of a province-tends to increase public expenditure in GDP since civil unrest in ethnic minority areas is depicted as one of the major threats to China"s social stability (Wang 2002) . Localities with more ethnic minorities receive more central grants to moderate potential social instability (Wang 2002) , and may spend more for public security.
Demand for public services. The relative size of the non-working population (compared to the working population) may increase the level of public expenditure. Martin (1982) finds a positive correlation between public expenditures and the population shares of students and the elderly. Students demand education services while the elderly require more health care.
Thus, we hypothesize that governments will be larger in places when non-workers comprise greater percentages of the population. The unemployed may request that local government 2 Lalvani (2002: 27-28) notes that the collusion hypothesis has two implications that merit further investigation. They are "(1) total government size will, ceteris paribus, increase with the level of collusion, and (2) the size of each level of government will, ceteris paribus, increase as collusion increases because no component of government will remain a member of the cartel if it does not benefit from it." Zhu and Krug (2005: 8) argue that "The more the intergovernmental grants, the larger the total government size is." 8 spend more on unemployment compensation and job training. Cusack, Notermans and Rein (1989) and Esping-Andersen (1996) provide evidence supporting the positive relationship between the unemployment rate and government size. In this study, we hypothesize that higher unemployment will be associated with larger government expenditures. ). This measure is not immune to criticism (Hood 1995) . Nevertheless, because the Chinese government tends to under-report public sector employment, and since data for other proxies are not available, the share of local budgetary expenditure in GDP is employed by this study.
Independent variables

1) Economic development (RGDP_PC) is measured by provincial real GDP per capita.
This variable is adopted for testing the validity of Wagner"s law in China.
2) Scale effects are measured by total population divided by the number of counties in a province (CP).
3) Openness is measured by two proxies. Openness to trade (IMPEXP_PC) is calculated as the total amount of trade (imports plus exports) per capita in a province. Foreign direct investment (FDI_STOCK) is measured as the accumulated FDI stock per capita.
4) Fiscal decentralization is measured by three indicators: expenditure decentralization (SONE), revenue decentralization (SONR), and vertical imbalance (VER_IMB). Following
Marlow (1988) and Jin and Zou (2002) , we employ the ratio of provincial budgetary expenditure to total budgetary expenditure as the measure of expenditure decentralization.
The ratio of local revenue to total government revenue evaluates the degree of revenue decentralization as proposed by Jin and Zou (2002) . In literature, there are several ways of defining vertical imbalance. Jin and Zou (2002) employ the share of central transfers in subnational expenditure, and Rodden (2002) proposes the share of central transfers in total subnational revenue as a proxy for vertical imbalance. In this paper, we adopt the method suggested by Jin and Zou (2002) ; thus, vertical imbalance is measured by the ratio of central transfers to subnational expenditure. We calculate the partial correlation coefficients between all repressors, which indicate that expenditure decentralization (SONE), revenue decentralization (SONR) and vertical imbalance (VER_IMB) are highly correlated. Proxies for openness to trade (IMPEXP_PC) and FDI stocks (FDI_STOCK) are also highly correlated. To control for multicolinearity problems, we enter each variable separately in the regression.
Empirical results
[ Table 1 to Table 3 about here] The Hausman test statistics presented in Tables 1 and 2 suggest that the individual specific effects are correlated with the regressors. Consequently, the fixed-effects model is preferred.
When factors like FDI stocks (FDI_STOCK), expenditure decentralization (SONE) and revenue decentralization (SONR) are all excluded from the model, as is presented in the last column of Table 1 , the Hausman test statistics suggest that we do not have an endogeneity problem. Thus, we can conclude that "reverse causality" may come from these three factors. Table 3 presents empirical results obtained by using the two-step GMM estimator. We enter lags one to three of the regressors as instruments to deal with the endogeneity problem.
Hansen test statistics indicate that the instruments we adopted are all valid. Notice that adopting the GMM approach can also produce efficiency gains, which can be observed by (5) There is no evidence supporting the conjecture that minority population density, the gross dependency ratio or the unemployment rate has positive effects on government size.
Discussion
Some scholars attribute expansions in the size of government in China, notwithstanding occasional downsizing initiatives, to significant events or periods in its unique history, for example, the adoption of a Leninist party-state and a planned economy in the late 1940s (Burns 2001: 420) . It is true that the size of China's government has been influenced by the nation"s unique characteristics. Nevertheless, if we over-emphasize these factors unique to China, they may narrow our view with respect to identifying the problems of bureaucratic expansion in the country. The strategy adopted by this study is to provide a rigorous (2009) argue that Wagner"s law has more explanatory power in multi-country-than in single-country analyses since, in some countries, distinct from the private sector, the public sector is subject to political pressures, such as rentseeking (wherein individuals bribe public officials to obtain posts in the public sector). Some research further shows that bureaucratic expansion serves to promote rent-creation (bribery) and political patronage (Gelb, Knight and Sabot 1991) . The implications of our finding that poorer localities tend to have larger governments may be more nuanced. Rent-seeking and nepotism are more prevalent in poor localities in China. Based on field research, Liu and Tao (2007) report that governments in poor localities in China tend to improve public services less than those in coastal areas.
Our results do not lend support to the Leviathan hypothesis. In our understanding, the effect of fiscal decentralization in curbing government expansion relies on some strict conditions, such as revenue autonomy granted to local authorities and limited central transfers or subsidies. Fiscal decentralization in developing countries may not fit squarely within these conditions. The Chinese situation neatly fits the collusion hypothesis because the central government has increased transfers to local governments markedly. Thus, expenditure 15 decentralization does not lead to hard budget constraints and tighter fiscal discipline in local China. In addition, we fail to find evidence to support the positive relationship between government size and minority factors, the gross dependency ratio, and the unemployment rate.
The most interesting findings in this study are that population per county and openness to trade and FDI reduce government size. To interpret scale effects, we would like to draw attention to dependent variables again. For many countries, personnel costs comprise the single largest item in governmental budgets. In China, this is more pronounced as personnel costs account for more than half of local government expenditures (Burns 2007; Fock and Wong 2008) . Civil servants and teachers consume the majority of those costs. Scale effects suggest that the average cost of public services provided by civil servants and teachers is much cheaper in localities with larger populations per county. Notice that the implication of scale effects should not be exaggerated. When two or more county units are merged, the cost of public services and goods may decline. It may also compromise the quality of public services.
Our empirical results document that openness to trade may serve as a device to promote a lean local government. Government efficiency improves when the capacity of institutional learning and adaptation has been enhanced. Especially when economic development is a primary concern of local leaders in developing countries, openness and FDI presence may become an engine both for GDP growth and governance enhancement. Cole et al. (2009) argue that provinces with better governance tend to attract more FDI inflows. Consequently, local officials have strong incentives to promote trade and FDI since they can reap great political capital from both improved administrative performance and GDP growth.
Conclusion
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This paper reviews the literature regarding government size and provides an empirical study using data from China. Our research contributes to the literature by offering a careful empirical study for the case of a transition economy. In addition, the policy implications drawn from our findings are applicable not only to transition economies like China, but are applicable to other developing countries.
The results of our study document the following findings. In addition, public consumption and employment may promote local economic growth but, at the same time, they may be exploited as free goods for enhancing public officials" personal interests. Bureaucratic expansion as a result of nepotism has been embedded in the Chinese political and economic environment for a long time (Zhong 2003) . Tensions exist between 17 advancing the welfare of the total population based on job creation in the public sector and maximizing personal interests through rent creation and poor governance. Thus, further research may need to go beyond the standard determinants of government size to explore the contributions of bureaucrats and other public officials to the growth of the public sector. ). * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 2). The GMM estimates reported are all two-step results. 3). Asymptotic standard errors, asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity, are reported in parentheses. 4). All variables, except Minority Density, are in logarithm.
